IS THE THIRD TIME THE CHARM? A
COMPARISON OF THE GOVERNMENT'S
MAJOR ANTITRUST SETTLEMENTS
WITH AT&T THIS CENTURY*
Geoffrey M. Peters* *
The 1982 settlement of the government's antitrust suit
against the American Telephone and Telegraph Company
(AT&T)' appears to have revolutionary implications for the telephone system, reversing almost a century of increasing integration of the telephone network. Historical analysis, however,
suggests a more cautious evaluation. This settlement is the third
of its kind. Twice before, the Department of Justice has reached
an agreement with AT&T, each time ending legal action arising
out of the limitations of telephone regulatory policy. The two
previous settlements promised important structural changes in
the telephone industry that did not materialize. The most recent
settlement also promises sweeping changes. The question to be
addressed, then, is whether those promises will prove to be as
empty as their predecessors, and whether the changes that do
occur in the industry are the result of the settlement.
This article examines the two previous agreements and compares them to the current one, a comparison that suggests important implications about the recent agreement. Section I recounts
the events leading up to the Kingsbury Agreement between the
government and AT&T in 1913 and analyzes the effects of that
settlement on the telephone network. Section II discusses the
1956 consent decree that ended the antitrust action brought by
the government against the Bell System (Bell) in 1949. In these
sections the argument is made that neither of the earlier agreements achieved the goals of the cases they settled and that any
changes that did appear following the settlements were largely
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the result of other forces. Section III details the similarities between the recent settlement and its two predecessors and uses
those parallels to suggest some predictions for the future. The
final section offers more general conclusions.
I.

THE

1913

AGREEMENT AND CONSENT DECREE

Federal regulation of telephonic transmissions began with
the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910.2 By defining telephone companies
as common carriers, the Act granted the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) jurisdiction over them. The ICC, however,
exerted little influence over the telephone system, intervening
only when the Commission received complaints.
The Mann-Elkins Act was passed at a time of vigorous competition among rival telephone companies, that competition
stemming from the expiration in 1893 and 1894 of the most important Bell patents. 4 With the expiration of these patents, Bell's
share of the expanding market for telephone service declined
steadily until 1907. 5 By 1912, however, Bell's efforts to consolidate and extend its domination of the industry gave the Bell System control over roughly four-fifths of both exchange and toll
wires. 6 Bell's avowed policy became one of acquiring and
purchasing "opposition companies" wherever it could be done
7
legally and with the acquiescence of the public.
The Justice Department initially did not see any conflict between AT&T's policy and the Sherman Act,' and it rejected applications for antitrust actions against AT&T. Attorney General
George W. Wickersham did not, however, simply ignore the
2 Act ofJune 18, 1910, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.).
3 Id. § 7, 36 Stat. at 544-45; see Loeb, The CommunicationsAct Policy Toward Competition: A Failure to Communicate, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1, 6-9; 90 CENT. L.J. 370 (1920).
4 See Hough, The Law and the Telephone, 50 AM. L. REV. 425 (1916).
5

FCC,

INVESTIGATION OF THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES

128-

29 (1974). One author argues that this does not imply that 1907 represents the
nadir of Bell's power in the industry, on the theory that entry into the industry was

becoming more difficult and long-distance service, where Bell's advantage was relatively great, was becoming more important. G. BROCK, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
THE DYNAMICS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 121 (1981).
6 See infra table accompanying note 30. See generally Gabel, The Early Competitive
Era in Telephone Communication, 1893-1920, 34 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 340 (1969).
7 FCC, supra note 5, at 133-39; AT&T, 1910 ANNUAL REPORT 21. A sense of the
issues and personalities involved in this period of mergers can be found in H.
INDUSTRY:

MACMEAL, THE STORY OF INDEPENDENT TELEPHONY 138-202 (1934).

8 Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1982)).
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problem. InJanuary 1913, the Attorney General reacted to complaints from independent telephone companies by writing to the
chairman of the ICC, Charles Prouty, urging that body to undertake a thorough investigation of the telephone industry.9 Wickersham argued that many of the questions raised about AT&T's
allegedly anti-competitive operations "can not be appropriately
dealt with by the law department of the government, but should
be made the subject of regulation."' 0
Before the year was out, however, the Justice Department
filed an action against AT&T and its affiliates under the Sherman
Act, charging unlawful conspiracy to restrain and monopolize
trade in the transmission of telephone messages among the several states." A number of independent telephone companies
had constructed long-distance lines and were competing against
AT&T for long-distance customers in the Pacific Northwest. According to the Justice Department's complaint, the Bell companies had harassed those firms by refusing to interconnect Bell
lines with those of the independents, by lowering competitive
rates, by furnishing poor service when ordered to interconnect
their lines, and by otherwise acting in an illegal manner.' 2 That
pattern of activity allegedly culminated in the acquisition by the
Bell System of the victims of its transgressions, independent telephone companies-most notably one called Northwestern Long
Distance. 13
While government witnesses testified in the antitrust case
and the ICC pursued its investigation, Nathan Kingsbury, a vicepresident of AT&T, and Attorney GeneralJ. C. McReynolds held
a series of meetings.' 4 At the same time, through written correspondence and meetings, the Attorney General elicited the views
of the independent telephone companies on how best to protect
their interests.' 5 By December of 1913, an arrangement between
AT&T and the government had been negotiated. The Kingsbury
Commitment, as it came to be called, was set out in a letter from
Kingsbury to the Attorney General, dated December 19, 1913.
9 Letter from George W. Wickersham to Charles A. Prouty (Jan. 7, 1913).
10 Id.
''

Original Petition, United States v. AT&T (D. Or. 1913) (suit terminated by

consent decree Mar. 26, 1914).
12 Id. at 16-19, 26.
13 Id. at 20-25.

14 Letter from Nathan C. Kingsbury to Attorney GeneralJ.C. McReynolds (Dec.
19, 1913).
15 Letter from the Independent Telephone Association of America to the Assis-

tant to the Attorney General G. Carroll Todd (Dec. 18, 1913).
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In that letter, AT&T agreed to dispose of its holdings in Western
Union, to refrain from acquiring competing telephone companies, and to offer toll-line connections to qualified independent
telephone companies.' 6 Contemporaneous letters from the Attorney General to Kingsbury and from President Wilson to the
Attorney General acknowledged AT&T's commitment.' 7
The immediate effect of the agreement was to terminate the
ICC investigation and the antitrust proceedings. 8 The latter
ended in a consent decree whereby the Bell System agreed to
abolish its exclusive service contracts for toll service; to offer future contracts assuring equal access to Northwestern and other
non-Bell companies; and to divest itself of ownership of Northwestern, as well as an independent company in Spokane, Washington, and certain other properties.' 9
One provision of the consent decree foreshadowed the difficulties that emerged from the decree's implementation. That
provision gave to the citizens of Spokane the right to decide by
voting whether or not it would be in their best interest to allow
their local phone company to be consolidated into the Bell System. 20 The voters chose consolidation and the court accepted
their petition for modification of the consent decree in September, 1914.21 A further modification in 1922 permitted a Bell
company to reacquire Northwestern. 2 2 Thus, the immediate
structural elements of the settlement were undone in fewer than
ten years.
Purportedly, the long-term aim of both the Kingsbury Commitment and the consent decree was to preserve competition in
telephone communication, both by assuring to all firms equal access to local networks and by limiting the expansion of the Bell
System. That goal had two problems. First, as the immediate
modification of the consent decree suggested, the public had little desire for duplication of local telephone service. 2' The Attor16 Letter from Nathan C. Kingsbury to Attorney GeneralJ.C. McReynolds (Dec.
19, 1913).
17 Id.; Letter from Woodrow Wilson toJ.C. McReynolds (Dec. 19, 1913).
18 Interstate Commerce Comm'n, Press Release (Apr. 1915).
19 Decree, United States v. AT&T (D. Or. 1914) (consent decree entered Mar.
26).
20 Id.
11.
21 Order Modifying Decree, United States v. AT&T (D. Or. 1914) (order of
Sept. 7 modifying decree of Mar. 26).
22 Order Modifying Decree, United States v. AT&T (D. Or. 1922) (order of Oct.
20 modifying decree of Mar. 26, 1914).
23 From the turn of the century until 1915, urban experimentation with competi-
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ney General recognized this limitation in his 1914 Annual
Report, where he stated that the Kingsbury Commitment was not
intended to preclude consolidation of local telephone communications. 24 On the other hand, there had been high hopes that the
Commitment would promote the development of an independent toll network that could compete against Bell. It may be, however, that the Commitment had the opposite effect, at least from
the perspective of the financial structure of Bell's independent
competitors.
Investors in the independent companies, we may assume,
were motivated by the hope that they would ultimately receive a
return on their investments. That return might have been realized by the sale of the company. To the extent that the Kingsbury Commitment forbade Bell to acquire independent toll
companies, potential investors in those firms were denied from
the outset one of the most likely buyers. Even if the Commitment did not actually bar any particular merger, the chance that a
sale to Bell could involve antitrust litigation would likely have
chilled the enthusiasm of investors in the independent companies.
Absent a significant commitment from investors, the intion in the provision of local telephone service was widespread. This meant that
two, and occasionally three, telephone companies solicited customers from a given
city or town for service on its own local network. The local network of each competing company was self-contained and was not connected to that of its competition. Each company strung its own wire network, often producing a haze of wires
on city streets that threatened to block the sun. The problems encountered by
municipalities with competing suppliers of local telephone service can be demonstrated by reference to a photograph of a New York City street taken in 1888. The
photograph reveals a sky beclouded by telephone wires. SeeJ. BRooKs, TELEPHONE,
THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS plate 14 (1976). Had there been competition in New
York City, the number of wires would have been nearly doubled. Local competition, or "dual service" as it came to be called, proved inconvenient to the subscribers as well, for it meant that one had to subscribe to each of the competing
telephone companies if one were to be able to reach all of the city's telephone
subscribers. Accordingly, regular telephone users, particularly businesses, had two
telephones where we customarily see only one today. The Kansas Supreme Court
described its feelings about dual service, "[t]wo telephone systems serving the same
constituency place a useless burden upon the community, cause sorrow of heart
and are altogether undesirable." Janicke v. Washington Mut. Tel. Co., 96 Kan. 309,
310, 150 P. 633, 634 (1915).
24 1914 ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 14 ("local communities generally free to have'one
telephone system" as long as connections are made "with all long-distance interstate lines").
25 This chilling effect became the subject of congressional discussion in 1921.
See Consolidation of Competing Telephone Companies: Joint Hearings on S. 1313 Before the
Committee on Interstate Commerce, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1921).
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dependent companies would have felt financially constrained
from undertaking, expanding, and upgrading their plants.
The failure of the Kingsbury Commitment to catalyze the
emergence of a viable long-distance network to compete against
the Bell network may also have been the result of the Commitment's focus on mergers to the exclusion of Bell's interconnection policies. Beginning in 1907, Bell's competitive strategy
included restricting its companies from granting connections to
those independent firms that either competed with Bell companies or were interconnected with Bell's competitors.26 This
meant that any company that might have been willing to join a
large toll network which competed against Bell would have had
to forego the benefits of any future interconnection with a company in the Bell System.
Finally, the Justice Department's goal of maintaining competition conflicted with the desire of another government agency to
integrate the nation's telephone networks into a single system.
During the United States' participation in the First World War,
the government operated the telephone networks through the
Wire Control Board, chaired by the Postmaster General.2 7 The
Board's attitude was exactly opposite to that taken by the Justice
Department. 28 In the Board's view, government operation and
control of the telephone system would "undoubtedly cause the
and consolidation of competing systems whereever
coordination
29
possible."

The results of those competing objectives can be seen in table 1 below.
AT&T, supra note 7, at 21-23.
See 88 CENT. L.J. 335 (1919).
Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson, described by one commentator as an
"old-fashioned southwestern populist," spearheaded efforts begun in 1913 to nationalize the telegraph and telephone systems. In his view, transmission by wire
was a natural extension of the duties of the Post Office. His goal was at least temporarily realized on July 22, 1918, when President Wilson assumed control of the
wires. J. BROOKS, supra note 23, at 148-51.
29 Postmaster General Bulletin No. 3 (Aug. 7, 1918); Postmaster General Bulletin No. 4 (Aug. 15, 1918).
26
27
28

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

258

[Vol. 15:252

Table IS"

Bell System Percentage Shares of the National Network
Date

Local Exchanges
Wires

Toll Wires

Stations
(Telephones)

1912
1917

79
84

84
89

-

1922
1927

85
91

92
94

65
73

1934

-

-

78

-

The Bell System increased its share of the telephone network by
each of the three indices in the years following the Kingsbury Agreement and the associated consent decree, and its share of toll circuits
was greater than its share of individual telephones. Both the relative levels of the three indices and their trends demonstrate that the
Justice Department's stated goals in its 1913 negotiations had little
relevance to the future development of the industry.
It should be noted that the trends documented in table 1 had
the continued approval of the rest of the Federal government. The
telephone networks were returned to private operation after World
War I, and Congress exempted the acquisition policies of telephone
companies from the antitrust laws in the Willis-Graham Act of
1921,31 provided that the ICC approved the acquisitions.3 2

The

ICC heard 275 acquisition cases between 1921 and the formation of
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 1934, almost all
of them involving acquisitions by the Bell System. 3 It approved
272 of them.3 4 In a massive investigation of the telephone industry
conducted during the first five years of its existence, the FCC concluded that AT&T had adhered to the agreements of 1913-14. s5
30 The sources for table I are: AT&T, BELL SYSTEM STATISTICAL MANUAL 502
(1964) (stations); UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 1927 CENSUS OF ELECTRICAL
INDUSTRIES table 26 (data for 1922 and 1927 exclude independent companies with
less than $10,000 gross income); UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 1917 CENSUS OF
ELECTRICAL INDUSTRIES table 24 (local exchange and toll wires; data for 1912 and
1917 exclude independent companies with less than $5000 gross income).
31 Act of June 10, 1921, Pub. L. No. 15, ch. 20, 42 Stat. 27 (1921) (amending
Transportation Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 152, ch. 91, § 407, 41 Stat. 456, 482 (repealed 1934); see Loeb, supra note 3, at 12.
32 Act of June 10, 1921, Pub. L. No. 15, ch. 20, 42 Stat. 27 (1921) (amending
Transportation Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 152, ch. 91, § 407, 41 Stat. 456, 482) (repealed 1934).
33 This information is derived from a manual survey supervised by the author of
all relevant ICC reports between the years 1921 and 1934.
34 See supra note 33.

35

3 FCC,
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SPECIAL INVESTIGATION DOCKET

1,
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The Kingsbury Commitment and its associated consent decree
in many respects parallel the current settlement. Legal action
against AT&T originated on the borderline between regulatory and
judicial authority, without clear boundaries being set. The objective
of the Department ofJustice was the same as it is today: to establish
competition in inter-exchange telephone service. Both agreements
extricated all the parties from the antitrust proceeding and seemed
to set a new direction for the Bell System and public policy. The
redirection of public and private policy, however, did not materialize for the period after the earlier agreement. The Bell System continued its policy of acquisition and consolidation with the support of
several branches of government. The results are shown in table 1.
Thus, the 1913-14 agreement simply ended the antitrust suit without achieving the goals of that litigation.
II.

THE

1956

AGREEMENT AND CONSENT DECREE

A different problem with telephone regulation became apparent in the years following the Second World War. As prices
rose, state regulators were subjected to repeated requests for
rate hikes by telephone operating companies.3 6 From its earliest
days, the Bell System had attempted to bring telephone service
to as many people as possible. 37 This policy, known as "universal
service," has also been a primary goal of state regulators since
the turn of the century and was written into the Federal Communications Act of 1934.38 The FCC and state regulators have promoted universal service by holding down the price of local
telephone service.
Faced with repeated applications for higher monthly telephone rates, the state regulators looked for alternatives to simply
granting the companies' requests. One approach, looking to the
relationship between local service and interstate toll service, was
the attempted shifting of costs into the interstate jurisdiction
where they would affect long-distance rather than local rates. 39 A
PORT ON CONTROL OF TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS, CONTROL OF INDEPENDENT
COMPANIES 40-41, 43-44 (1937).
36 See NATIONAL Ass'N OF R.R. AND UTILS. COMM'RS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-

NINTH ANNUAL CONVENTION 342, 349, 354 (1948); NATIONAL Ass'N OF R.R. AND
UTILS. COMM'RS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTY-FIRST ANNUAL CONVENTION 16 (1950);
NATIONAL ASS'N OF

R.R.

AND UTILS. COMM'RS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTY-SECOND

ANNUAL CONVENTION 45 (1951).
37 AT&T, supra note 7, at 22-27.
38 Act ofJune 19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610
(1982)).
39 The ability of state and Federal regulators to adjust the profitability of the
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second approach, looking at the relationship between local service and the equipment used to furnish it, sought to reduce the
prices that the telephone companies paid to Western Electric,
Bell's manufacturing arm, for equipment.
The second approach, unlike the first, probed the limits of
telephone regulation. While interstate telephone service was
regulated by the FCC, Western Electric was not regulated at all.
Inasmuch as it was neither a common carrier nor a public utility,
it did not fall within the jurisdiction of state or Federal commissions. State regulatory agencies complained to the Department
of Justice that they could not gather enough information on
Western Electric's costs to determine whether the prices Western
40
charged the operating companies were reasonable.
The FCC's investigation of the telephone industry in the
1930's examined the relationship between Western Electric and
the rest of the Bell System. 4 ' The Commission found that the
relationship was designed to use the local rate-setting procedures
to extract monopolistic profits for Western's telephone prodUCtS. 4 2 In 1882 the parent company, then called the American
Bell Telephone Company, granted to Western the exclusive right
to supply the telephones and telephone equipment used in the
Bell System.4 3 The FCC challenged the "professed purpose" of
the contract-to assure the Bell System of an adequate supply of
telephones-and found that the actual purpose was to "assure
the Western Electric Co. a monopoly in the supplying of equip'4 4
ment to the operating licensee companies of the Bell System."
The terms of the contract also assured that only the Bell System
local companies and AT&T arose out of the fact that much of the plant and equipment that is used for local calling is also used for long-distance calling. The most
obvious example is the telephone instrument itself. The allocation of the cost of
such jointly used plant and equipment between local and interstate operations affects the profitability of local and long-distance service even though local and longdistance rates are held constant. Debate over the "proper" allocation ofjoint costs
became heated in the 1940's and persists today. See generally R. GABEL, DEVELOPMENT OF SEPARATIONS PRINCIPLES IN THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY (1967); J. SICHTER,
SEPARATIONS PROCEDURES IN THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS
OF A PUBLIC POLICY (1977); Temin & Peters, Cross-Subsidization in the Telephone Network, 21 WILLAMETTE L.J.(1985) (forthcoming).
40 NATIONAL Ass'N OF R.R. AND UTILS. COMM'RS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTIETH

92-95 (1948).
FCC, supra note 5, passim.
Id. at 585-89.

ANNUAL CONVENTION

41
42

43 Id. at 237. The contract was amended in 1908 without substantially changing

any of the terms essential to the Commission's discussions. Id. at 238.
44 Id. at 237-38.
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companies would have access to Western products. 45 The Commission concluded its condemnation of the vertical structure of
the Bell System by charging that Western's accounting practices
served to inflate the cost of telephone equipment sold to the operating companies. 6 Those inflated figures, the Commission
contended, resulted in the setting of higher local rates than
would have resulted had the state regulators used the actual cost
of Western-manufactured equipment,
which was "much lower"
47
than Western's reported

CoStS.

Incited by and armed with the FCC's findings, state regulators appealed to the Attorney General for action by the Justice
Department, which brought a complaint against Western Electric
and AT&T in January 1949.48 The complaint, based on the
FCC's findings in the 1930's, charged that Western and AT&T
had monopolized trade in telephone equipment. 9 It sought to
separate Western Electric from AT&T and Bell Telephone Laboratories, the research branch of the Bell System.5" Once separated, Western Electric was itself to be split into three competing
units which would sell equipment to AT&T and the Bell operating companies by competitive bidding. 5 ' The government also
asked the court to force AT&T to relinquish its control over the
operating companies' telephone equipment specifications.52
Lastly, the government demanded that Western Electric and Bell
Laboratories license their patents to competitors on a reasonable
basis.53
All parties to the suit viewed the divestiture of Western Electric as the central focus of the case.5 4 As the government's lead
attorney said, "the basic purpose of the suit is to introduce some
competition in the purchase [of telephone apparatus and equipment] by the Bell operating companies and the long lines department of AT&T. '
45

46

55

This statement suggests

the Justice

Id.

Id. at 321-22.

Id. at 322.
48 See Complaint, United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH)
47

68,246 (D.N.J.Jan. 24) (complaint filed Jan. 14, 1949), vacated and replaced, 1982-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) t 64,900 (D.D.C. Aug. 24).
49 Id. passim.
50 Id. at 68-69.
51 Id. at 69-71.
52 Id. at 68-71.
53 Id. at 71-72.
54 See generally Oppenheim, Timberg & Van Cise, Divestiture as a Remedy Under the
Federal Antitrust Laws, 19 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 119 (1950).
55 The Consent Decree Programof the Department ofJustice: Hearings Before the Antitrust
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Department had decided that Western Electric both enjoyed a
monopoly in the sale of telephone equipment and was beyond
the control of state and Federal regulation. The government,
therefore, hoped to substitute the discipline of competition for
the unattainable discipline of regulation.5 6 AT&T also saw divestiture as the focus of the case, although, understandably, it did
not refer to any need to introduce competition into the telephone equipment market.5 7
The case never went to trial. It was settled through a negotiated agreement between AT&T and the Justice Department. The
settlement received court approval in 1956.58 The negotiations
appear to have centered on the issue of divestiture until November 1955, when Attorney General Brownell abandoned the government's demand for divestiture. The reason the government
changed its position is not clear, although the FCC and the Defense Department seem to have played important roles.59
In a related development, much of the original motivation
for the suit had disappeared when the FCC adopted the alternative approach to the problem of rising local rates. 60 Through a
series of "separations" agreements with AT&T and state regulators, the FCC approved a plan that shifted costs from intrastate
to interstate services, thereby reducing the need to raise local
rates. 6 1 The critical negotiations took place in 1951 while the antitrust suit was in progress. 62 Thus, the original goal of the antitrust action, the lowering of local rates, was accomplished
through regulation. From the point of view of traditional
microeconomic theory, the regulatory solution could only be apSubcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3613 (1958)
(statement of Mr. Baldridge) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Hearings].
56 For the economic theory behind the interchangeability of regulation and competition for the purpose of controlling markets, see F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 518-42 (1970).
57 STAFF OF ANTITRUST SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH
CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON THE CONSENT DECREE PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE 33 (Comm. Print 1959) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST REPORT].
58 United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246 (D.N.J.

Jan. 24), vacated and replaced, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,900 (D.D.C. Aug. 24).
59 ANTITRUST REPORT, supra note 57, at 51, 55-59, 63-65, 71-78. See also id. at
39, where the subcommittee suggests that AT&T may have received "special and
preferred treatment" from the Department of Justice as a result of improper
conduct.

See supra notes 39 & 40 and accompanying text.
61 See generally R. GABEL, supra note 39 (history of allocating costs through "separations"); J. SICHTER, supra note 39 (same); Temin & Peters, supra note 41 (same).
62 See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 136-38 (D.D.C. 1982), afd sub
60

nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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proximate and probably temporary. The essential difficulty, that
of properly pricing Western Electric's sales to the operating telephone companies, remained.
Whatever the cause of the government's change in position,
it was accompanied by a change in the perceived boundary of
regulation, just as the first antitrust suit against AT&T in 1913
involved a change in the perceived boundary of the Justice Department's authority. In a letter to Brownell, written at his request on November 30, 1955, the FCC asserted "that adequate
powers reside in regulatory authorities to deal with the matter of
Western's prices and profits, insofar as they may affect the investment and expenses of affiliated operating telephone
companies. "163
An earlier draft of the letter, prepared by Bernard Strassburg, chief of the Rates and Revenues Branch of the FCC's Common Carrier Telephone Division, had questioned whether the
regulators had the resources to conduct effectively inquiries into
Western's costs, inquiries they were legally permitted to make.64
He further observed that the FCC lacked sufficient information to
speculate on whether Western's prices were above or below the
price that a competitive market would set. These passages were
deleted in the final version of the letter,65 possibly because the
FCC wanted to strengthen AT&T's position.
Agreement on a consent decree was reached soon after the
Attorney General abandoned the government's demand for the
divestiture of Western Electric. 6 6 The consent decree had two
parts. First, it restricted AT&T to "the furnishing of common
carrier communication services" and Western Electric to the
manufacture and sale of equipment to the Bell System. 67 Second, it provided for a royalty-free licensing of all Bell patents.68
Brownell defended his decision not to press the divestiture
demand on the grounds that the court would not have granted it
and that Western was supplying telephone equipment at prices
Letter from the FCC to Attorney General Brownell (Nov. 30, 1955), reprinted
348.
at 74-75, 77.
65 Id.
66 See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 136-38 (1982), aff'd sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
67 United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 68,246, at
71,137-38 (D.N.J.Jan. 24), vacated and replaced, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,900
(D.D.C. Aug. 24).
68 Id. at 71,132, 71,139-41.
63

in

ANTITRUST REPORT, supra note 57, at
64 ANTITRUST REPORT, supra note 57,
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beneath those that a competitive market would charge. 69 The
credibility of the latter point becomes doubtful when viewed in
the light of Strassburg's draft letter. Assistant Attorney General
Stanley Barnes seemed similarly disingenuous in his post hoc attempt to shift the focus to Bell's patents, which, in testimony
before a Senate subcommittee, he claimed to have been "the
heart of [matter]," 7 ° even though he had referred two years earlier to compulsory patent licensing as "window dressing" that
would do little to bring competition into Western's market. 7 '
Like the Kingsbury Agreement, the 1956 consent decree terminated the investigation and prosecution of AT&T and the Bell
System companies. Unlike the earlier agreement, however, it did
not even address the concerns that prompted the filing of the
suit: the difficulty state and Federal regulators faced in determining the reasonableness of prices charged by Western Electric to
AT&T and the Bell operating companies.
The immediate effects of confining the non-government
businesses of AT&T and Western Electric to common carrier
communications were that Western had to stop making railroad
signalling equipment and had to spin off its sound recording and
typesetting operations while the telephone companies had to
give up their private communications business.72 These activities
accounted for a very small part of those firms' businesses in
1956. 7' An AT&T representative stated three years later that if
those restrictions were to have had a serious limiting effect on the
Bell System, it would have been on the System's ability to enter
different lines of business in the future.7 1 Moreover, the agreement's fallibility was demonstrated almost immediately when the
California Supreme Court permitted Pacific Telephone to continue offering mobile communications systems, even though they
were not a common carrier service, on the grounds that the systems were subject to state regulation and the consent decree expressed no intention to prohibit the Bell System from offering
supra note 57, at 86-87.
Id. at 33 n. 14.
71 Id. at 60, 342.
72 Id. at 98.
73 Western Electric's 1956 sales totaled $2370 million. Gross sales of the proscribed lines of business totaled approximately $19.05 million annually, less than
one per cent of 1956 total sales (railroad signalling equipment-$250,000; sound
recordings-$16 million; Teletypesetter Corp.-$2.8 million). Id. at 98 nn. 34-36.
74 Id. at 98 n.39.
69 ANTITRUST REPORT,
70
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regulated services.75
The consent decree's patent provisions also seemed to have
had little effect.7 6 There are several explanations. First, the decree's requirements differed little from Bell's existing patent policy.77 Second, the Bell System was permitted to require licensees
78
to grant it reciprocal rights in the licensee's own patents.
Lastly, even for pre-decree patents, which had to be licensed for
no royalty, the Bell System could charge a fee for providing
tech79
nical information necessary to utilize the patents.
It might have been hoped that the patent requirements of
the consent decree would have had the effect of bringing competition to the telephone market by giving competitors the ability to
manufacture anything that Western Electric could produce. The
ability to manufacture, however, does not necessarily carry with it
the ability to sell. Potential manufacturers complained that there
was no market for telephone equipment made by independent
suppliers. 80 It would take a series of court and FCC decisions
over the next two decades to introduce some competition into
the market for terminal equipment.
In its broad outline, the 1956 consent decree followed the
pattern of the earlier Kingsbury Commitment. It arrested an antitrust action against AT&T which had arisen in the gray area between regulatory and antitrust policy. More specifically, the
antitrust suit had arisen as a result of apparent limitations of regulatory authority that led to antitrust questions. The settlement
had little relevance to the original issues of the case, appearing
instead to offer a revision of industry structure. Events, specifically the growth of separations, had largely mooted the original
problem.8 ' And the settlement, finally, promised far more than it
75 Commercial Communications Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 50 Cal. 2d 512,
327 P.2d 513 (1958), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 359 U.S. 341 (1959).
76 United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,246, at
71,139-42 (D.N.J. Jan. 24), vacated and replaced, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,900
(D.D.C. Aug. 24); see ANTITRUST REPORT, supra note 57, at 108, 120; Note, Antitrust:
Consent Decree: The History and Effect of Western Electric Co. v. United States, 45
CORNELL L.Q 88, 93-95 (1959).
77 See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH)
68,246, at
71,139-43 (D.N.J. Jan. 24), vacated and replaced, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,900
(D.D.C. Aug. 24).
78 Id. at 71,140.
79 Id. at 71,141-42.
80 ANTITRUST REPORT, supra note 57, at 108.
81 See supra note 39. The change in separation payments mooted the original
purpose of the case in the following way. State regulators had believed, and the
FCC had found, that local ratepayers were subsidizing Western Electric through the
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delivered. In all these characteristics, the 1956 consent decree
recalled the earlier agreement and consent decree.

III.

THE

1974

SUIT AND THE

1982

SETTLEMENT

The government's 1974 antitrust suit against AT&T8 2 grew
out of yet another ambiguous zone between antitrust and regulatory authority. In this disputed terrain, the Justice Department
and the FCC operated with uncertainty and disregard of each
other, generating the confusion that led to legal action. As a result of the regulatory policy established in the 1950's, relatively
low local rates had been funded through an elaborate system of
subsidies from the more profitable parts of the telephone network. 8 3 This regulatory scheme became unstable when the FCC
began to embrace the traditional goal of the justice Department's
antitrust policy-competition. At the prompting of the Federal
courts in the Carterfone decision,8 4 in 1968 the FCC started to encourage competition against AT&T. 8 5 Without relaxing its general policy in favor of universal service,
the FCC began to
accept applications from prospective entrants into Bell's most
profitable markets on a piecemeal basis. 87 AT&T reacted in defense of the nationwide network it controlled by resisting interconnection with these new competitors.
Furthermore, AT&T's promise to confine its business to telephony as defined in the 1956 consent decree-an agreement
easily made at the time-had become an irritation by the midmechanism of inflated prices charged by Western to the local companies for equipment. Changes in separations procedures created a subsidy running in the opposite direction, through the mechanism of shifting AT&T's long-distance revenues
to the local companies. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
82 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Mary-

land v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
83 See supra note 39.

84 Carterfone v. AT&T, 250 F. Supp. 188, 192 (N.D. Tex.), affd, 365 F.2d 486

(5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1008 (1967).
85 In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d
420, petition for reconsiderationdenied, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968).
86 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
87 See, e.g., In re Applications of Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d
953 (1969); Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975). The FCC received 46 separate applications
for permission to build microwave systems. Id. at 1145 n. 1. See Specialized Common Carrier Servs., 29 F.C.C.2d 870, 915, af'd sub nom. Washington Utils. &
Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975),
where the Commission acknowledged the likelihood that Bell's high profit markets
would be relatively more attractive than other Bell markets to potential
competitors.
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1970's. The rapidly advancing technology of telecommunications had made the definition of telephone service difficult.
AT&T, having traditionally followed new technologies to the
point of commercial application, was naturally inclined to view
markets created by the new technologies as within the scope of
its telephone business. The nascent ambiguity of the 1956 decree, however, meant that entry into those markets required FCC
approval. In the case of AT&T's entry into the market for enobtaining approval
hanced network services and data processing,
88
required at least ten years of hearings.

The conflicts between AT&T, its competitors, and the government finally erupted in over forty private antitrust suits
against AT&T, in addition to the 1974 action brought by the Jus89
tice Department. The wording of the government's complaint
against AT&T provides little insight into precisely what the government hoped to achieve by bringing the suit. Rather, it attacked a broad range of actions taken by AT&T during the
previous seventy years. 90 If granted, the relief prayed for would
have left little of the existing telephone network intact. Not only
did the complaint repeat the 1949 suit's demand for the divestiture of Western Electric, but it also asked that the operating companies, Bell Laboratories, and AT&T's operating divisions be
separated from each other. 9 ' The complaint further sought that
Western Electric, Bell Laboratories, and the operating companies themselves be broken up into an unspecified number of
pieces .92
This interpretation of the government's motives identifies
the case as part of the government's generalized attack on big
business and regulation during the early 1970's. 3 That period
88 See In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence
of Computer and Communication Servs. and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970)
(Computer I),final decision and order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971), affd in part sub nom. GTE
Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir.), decision on remand, 40 F.C.C.2d 293
(1973); In re Section 64.702 of the Comm'rs Rules and Regulations, 77 F.C.C.2d
384 (Computer H),final decision modified, 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980), aff'd sub nom. Computer and Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
cert. denied sub nom. Lousiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 461 U.S. 938 (1983).
89 Complaint, United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (complaint filed Nov. 20, 1974), afd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001
(1983).
90 Id. at 11-13.
91 Id. at 14-15.
92 Id.
93 See generally Comment, Storming the AT&T Fortress: Can the FCC Deregulate Competitive Common CarrierServices?, 32 FED. COMM. L.J. 205 (1980).
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witnessed major government antitrust suits against IBM, 94 breakfast-cereal makers, 9 5 and oil companies,9 6 in addition to the deregulation of the trucking 97 and airline industries.9 8
The lack of focus in the AT&T case did not prevent the litigation from becoming a millstone around the necks of both the
Justice Department and AT&T. Indeed, it probably helped. By
the time Assistant Attorney General William Baxter took charge
of the government's case, both parties seemed ready for a settlement, despite Baxter's celebrated statement of his intention to
"litigate the case to the eyeballs." 9 9
Baxter brought the case into sharper focus. He found the
source of AT&T's monopoly power to be in its control over the
local networks, which had been protected from competition as a
result of state regulation for over seventy years.°0 0 Following the
precedent of the 1956 consent decree, Baxter approved of the
connection among AT&T's operating divisions, Western Electric,
and Bell Laboratories. The theory of the agreement between the
Justice Department and AT&T, presented to the court on January 8, 1982, followed this simple scheme: by isolating control
over the local networks from the rest of the Bell System, Baxter
hoped to reduce AT&T's dominance over the rest of its markets
while allowing AT&T to compete freely within them.' 0 ' The
94 See, e.g., In re IBM, 687 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1982) (district court judge ordered
to conclude antitrust action against IBM after 13 years of litigation).
95 See, e.g., FTC v. J.E. Lonning, 539 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (administrative
proceeding alleged that three manufacturers had a "shared monopoly" in the
ready-to-eat cereal markets).
96 See generally Adams, Vertical Divestiture of the Petroleum Majors: An Affirmative Case,
30 VAND. L. REV. 1115 (1977); Greening, Increasing Competition in the Oil Industry:
Government Standardsfor Gasoline, 14 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 193 (1977); Ritchie, Petroleum
Dismemberment, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1131 (1976).
97 See Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (codified at
and amending scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11707 (1982)); Cutler, Regulatory Mismatch and Its Cure (Book Review), 96 HARV. L. REV. 545, 550 (1982).
98 See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified at and amending scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1552, 1701-1743
(1982)). See generally 41 J. OF AIR L. & CoM. 573, 573-873 (1975) (untitled symposium on airline regulation); 43J. OF AIR L. & COM. 641, 641-690 (1977) (additional
commentary on airline deregulation); Colloqium: The Deregulation of Industry, 51 IND.
L.J. 682, 682-755 (1976).
99 N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
100 A. VON Auw, HERITAGE & DESTINY: REFLECTIONS ON THE BELL SYSTEM IN
TRANSITION 112 (1983).
101 Stipulation of Parties, United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 68,246 (D.N.J. Jan. 24) (stipulation filed Jan. 8, 1982, consenting to entry
of modification of final consent judgment), vacated and replaced, 1982-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 64,900 (D.D.C. Aug. 24).
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court explicitly adopted Baxter's reasoning in its approval of the

proposed settlement. 102
It remains to be seen, however, whether the announced
goals of the settlement can be achieved by the terms of the agreement. The Kingsbury Agreement and the 1956 consent decree
also had grand designs, but neither achieved more than the removal of unresolved issues from the antitrust arena. There are
two categories of reasons that suggest that the recent consent decree may not achieve its objectives with any more success than
the two previous antitrust settlements. First, the court has contaminated the theoretically pure nature of the proposed settlement with its insistence upon modifications. Second, the Bell
System is very large and very old, and it is traveling along a wellestablished trajectory with considerable inertia.
Turning first to the court's modifications of the proposed
decree, it is evident that the court attempted to blur the clear
isolation of the local monopolies from the competitive markets of
the industry. The court made fleeting reference to the need to
allow the inter-exchange market to operate freely, but it has become obvious that the court was willing, if not anxious, to permit
the institution of a subsidy from the long-distance ratepayer to
the local ratepayer.'0 3 The FCC appears to have preempted this
decision, imposing an "access charge" on local ratepayers to
avoid such a subsidy. 10 4 If the court has its way, however, longdistance carriers will pay a charge to the local companies with
which they interconnect. 10 5 Although the court stated at one
point that such charges must be cost-justified, it has stated repeatedly that the cross-subsidy should be set at a level high
enough to ensure that local rates do not increase after the divestiture.' °6 The effect of the settlement as approved by the court,
therefore, would not even affect the structure of telephone rates.
Instead, it would perpetuate the system of subsidies that contributed so profoundly to the regulatory crisis that produced the
102 The court stated that "[p]ast restrictions on AT&T were justified primarily
because of its control over the local Operating Companies." United States v.
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 170 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
103 Id. at 169.
104 In re MTS and WATS Mkt. Structure (Phase I), 93 F.C.C.2d 241 (1982).
65,333, at 69,973-75
105 United States v. AT&T, 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,756, at
(D.D.C. Apr. 20); United States v. AT&T, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
69,862-63, 69,876 (D.D.C. opinion filed July 8).
106 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 169 n.161 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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government's suit in 1974.107 That rates are in fact changing is
the result of FCC policy rather than the antitrust settlement.
Another deviation lies in the court's treatment of telephone
directories. In an effort to hold down local rates, the court required Bell's directory advertising business, which was generating two billion dollars annual revenue, to remain with the
operating companies.'0 8 Although the "Yellow Pages" depend
on the operating companies for subscriber information, the market for directory advertising is not part of the operating companies' natural-monopoly business. Independent directories,
similar to the "Yellow Pages," have begun to appear in many areas. The court's action gives operating companies the incentive
to favor their own directory business over that of the competition. Moreover, an industrial structure built on cross-subsidization recalls the conditions that the recent settlement was
designed to avoid. Such a deviation from the underlying principles of the settlement may not appear, by itself, overly threatening to the settlement's basic purposes; nevertheless, it betrays a
lack of recognition that such attempts to protect the local ratepayer undercut the theoretical structure of the settlement.
Not only has the court deviated from the theory of the settlement by seeking to make the local networks financially dependent
on competitive markets, but it also has shackled one of the competitors even after having claimed to have removed that competitor's monopoly power. The court has demanded that AT&T be
excluded from electronic publishing for a period of at least seven
years. 10 9 This restriction harkens back to the confinement of
AT&T to "telephone" business in the 1956 decree. As stated
above, the ambiguity of the 1956 restriction contributed to the
uncertainties that produced the 1974 case. It does not take a
great deal of imagination to recognize the contribution that the
current restriction on AT&T could make to a new gray area between the regulators and the courts.
The second category of problems facing the 1982 settlement
concerns AT&T's corporate inertia. In 1916 Judge Rose
observed:
In administering the anti-trust acts, a number of great and
powerful offenders against them have been dissolved. So far
107

See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.

108 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 193-94, 231 (D.D.C. 1982), afd sub

nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
109 Id.
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as is possible to judge, the consuming public has not as yet
greatly profited by their dissolution. It is perhaps not likely
that any benefit could have been expected until in the slow
course of time the ownership of the newly0 created corporations gradually drifts into different hands."
To apply this observation to the current divestiture one need
only substitute "management" for "ownership," because the holders of AT&T stock are so numerous as to leave control of the Bell
System in the hands of its upper level managers.' " Moreover, employees at all levels of AT&T and its various subsidiaries, known for
their long service, generally feel a strong loyalty to the Bell System.
That feeling has been reinforced by Bell's policy of rotating its management from company to company within the system according to
the system's needs.
The Bell System is now showing signs of reconstituting itself in
its old form, despite the severance of AT&T from the operating
companies. Like the Hydra, the operating companies seem to have
regenerative powers. At the national level, we find a coordinating
body called Bell Communications Research (Bellcore), originally
called the Central Service Organization." 2 The Defense Department had argued for a single contact point for the country's telephone network in order to serve the nation's security needs in times
of emergency." 3 Of the 8800 projected employees of Bellcore,
however, only 2200 were intended to serve the needs of the Defense
Department." 4 Furthermore, the independent telephone companies are not represented in Bellcore, nor are any interexchange carriers other than AT&T. Bellcore is hardly a duplicate of AT&T, but
I10 United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859, 902 (D. Md. 1916), appeal
dismissed, 256 U.S. 706 (1921).
1 11 Cf. Adams, Dissolution, Divorcement, Divestiture: The Pyrrhic Victories of Antitrust, 27
("The Standard Oil decree had the fatal flaw of leaving
economic control over the successor companies with the same interests that had
exercised control over the parent company prior to dissolution.").
65,756, at 69,871-74
112 See United States v. AT&T, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
(D.D.C. opinion filed July 8).
113 In each of the three efforts to break up AT&T, the military and defense establishments have been unnamed yet influential parties. Compare 88 CENT. L.J. 335,
335 (postal system control of telephone system during WWI intended to aid military) with United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 136-37 (D.D.C. 1982) (detailing Defense Department efforts during Korean War to encourage settlement of
1949 suit), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) and N.Y.
Times, Apr. 10, 1981, at D3, col. 1 (discussing Department of Defense concerns
over "strategic importance of an effective, integrated communications network").
''4
See United States v. AT&T, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,756, at 69,871-74,
69,893 n.246 (D.D.C. opinion filed July 8).
IND. L. REV. 1, 2 (1951)
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it will provide a structure for much of the intercompany communications that had previously gone through AT&T.
Beneath Bellcore, the Bell System has grouped the operating
companies into seven regions. All of the stock of the operating
companies of each region is held by regional holding companies.' 15
Thus, the holding-company structure attacked by the settlement of
suit is reproduced in seven smaller, yet
the government's antitrust
1 16
still massive, versions.
This reproduction of the industry's previous organization may
well frustrate the attempt to separate sharply the competitive and
regulated segments of the industry. The restrictions placed on the
operating companies by the settlement do not specifically address
the question of holding companies. Will the holding companies be
subject to the same restrictions, or will they be free to enter any
business of their choosing? If the holding companies invest in interexchange carriers, a reason to discriminate between competing carriers in giving access to the local networks would be recreated. A
similar problem would arise should the holding companies invest in
any business dealing with the local companies, such as telephone
equipment supply or electronic publishing companies.
Keeping the operating companies themselves out of the interexchange business may also prove difficult. Recent statements from
operating-company managements reveal their intention to offer
17
long-distance service in competition with unregulated carriers.'
Under the Plan of Reorganization approved by the court, the local
companies are permitted to offer inter-exchange service within the
boundaries of their service areas.1 18 At present, these toll routes
produce some five billion dollars of revenue annually." 9
Furthermore, the operating companies will be allowed to provide themselves with long-distance lines between local-service areas. 12 If the operating companies choose to supply this service for
115 Plan of Reorganization at 451-71, United States v. Western Elec. Co., 552 F.
Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (reorganization plan filed Dec. 16), affd sub nom. Maryland
v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
116 Cf. Hale, Trust Dissolution: "Atomizing" Business Units of Monopolistic Size, 40
COLUM. L. REV. 615 (1940) (discussing dissolution of horizontally integrated
corporations).
117 White, Local Bell Companies Begin Push to Re-Enter Long-DistanceMarket, Wall St.
J., Feb. 2, 1984, at 33, col. 4.
118 United States v. AT&T, 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,333, at 69,971 (D.D.C.
Apr. 20).
119 Id. at 69,971 n.23.
120 United States v. AT&T, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,756, at 69,866 (D.D.C.
opinion filed July 8).
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their own use, they could decide to provide enough capacity to handle their peak-load needs. Excess capacity would exist at other
times, and one could imagine that regulators might be persuaded to
permit the operating companies to sell their unused capacity to the
general public.
Thus, the holding companies and the operating companies may
become regional "Bell Systems," resembling the former national
system. They will be inclined to cooperate with one another because they will not compete against each other in any meaningful
sense. In contrast to the court-ordered break-ups of American Tobacco,'

21

Standard Oil, 1 2 2 and Alcoa,'

23

the new telephone holding

companies will not be selling in the same market; 1 24 thus, they cannot be expected to compete to the extent that the firms created in
those other industries compete against each other. Moreover, the
formal institutions in the new telephone industry appear designed
25
to facilitate inter-firm cooperation.1
Aside from the proliferation of new corporate names, the major
consequence of the settlement appears to be the increase in local
rates accompanying the introduction of "access charges." 126 Those
charges, however, were not part of the settlement. They were instituted by the FCC in opposition to the court's wishes and must there27
fore be considered distinct from the settlement itself.'
IV. CONCLUSION

History is not a sure guide to the future, and historians are
not prophets. Yet the aphorism that those who do not know history are condemned to repeat it indicates the folly of the oppoUnited States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See generally Wilgus, The
Standard Oil Decision; The Rule of Reason, 9 MIcH. L. REV. 643 (1911).
123 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
124 See United States v. AT&T, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,756, at 69,858
(D.D.C. opinion filed July 8), where the court justifies its requirement that the Operating Companies affix geographic designations in their uses of the name "Bell"
by stating that "[w]ith respect to exchange telecommunications, exchange access,
and directory advertising, the Operating Companies and the Regional Companies
will, by definition, be limited to clearly defined geographic areas." The only exception noted by the court to the regional isolation of the divested companies is the
possibility that they may wish to sell equipment in other regions than their own. Id.
125 See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
126 Wall St.J., Dec. 17, 1984, at 26, col. 3.
127 Cf. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 169 n.161 (D.D.C. 1982) (regulators free to retain or change inter-exchange revenues), afd sub nom. Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
121

122
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site extreme. History, while an uncertain guide, is preferable to
no guide at all.
This is particularly true if one considers the current restructuring of AT&T. The changing corporate form of AT&T and the
proliferation of new corporate entities with strange names appears to presage major changes in the telephone industry. And
changes there surely will be. But the extent to which competition
will be the guiding principle of telecommunications remains to
be seen. Twice before the government has tried to use antitrust
prosecution to resolve uncertainties in defining the limits of regulation. The problem in 1913 was the acquisition of local operating companies. The problem in 1949 was the inability of
regulators to assess equipment costs. And the problem in 1974
was the attempted entry of competing telephone companies.
The proposed solution in 1913 proved to be unworkable and
was quietly forgotten. The proposed solution in 1956 was not
even considered to be an adequate measure at the time it was
presented;1 28 instead the problem was largely mooted by the introduction of cross-subsidies from long-distance service that obviated the need to reduce the cost of equipment purchases.
Those cross-subsidies, it must be recalled, were instituted by telephone regulators, not the court. The solution of 1982 seems to
lack the precision and power needed to sever cleanly the competitive and regulated parts of the telephone industry. The removal
today of the cross-subsidization instituted by the FCC in the
1950's would be, perhaps appropriately, the FCC's doing. Analysts of the antitrust settlement need to distinguish between the
actions of the FCC and effects of the settlement itself.
As in the previous instances, the principal effect of the recent
antitrust settlement was termination of the antitrust suit. In addition, the settlement has forced a thorough corporate reorganization of AT&T. Whether this corporate reorganization, as
opposed to changes in telephone technology and FCC policies,
will alter the nature and extent of competition in the telephone
industry, however, is still an open question. The historical parallels suggest that the settlement itself will have a lesser impact
than the naive observer might suppose.
The role of antitrust action in heavily regulated areas may
well be different from its role in the economy generally. The
process of bringing a suit may serve as a catalyst for discussion
See Note, supra note 76, at 93 (attributing immediate commencement of congressional hearings to "apparent relative passivity of decree").
128
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and as an inducement for regulatory change. The results of that
process, rather than the settlement of the suit itself, may be the
relevant point.
The resulting settlement, in this scheme, emerges as a
method of terminating the suit once it has achieved its indirect
purpose. Of course, the power of the suit to force changes elsewhere may depend on the potential for the settlement to do
more. The Department of Justice, therefore, could never publicly embrace this theory without destroying it. Only after the
fact can outside observers be permitted to ask if, yet again, this is
the process by which the many branches of government have altered the direction of telephone regulation.

